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 The half-century that has passed since In Re Gault† began the modern era 
of American juvenile justice has produced an interesting pattern of discourse 
among liberal reformers. There is almost universal agreement on the substan-
tive objectives of reform in the institutions that determine the consequences for 
young persons who violate criminal laws. The central goal of reformers is to 
minimize the harm that penal criminal liability and confinement generates for 
adolescent development and thus to rely on the normal process of growing up 
as the appropriate method to minimize the threat of youth crime to community 
safety. We all agree that the best cure for youth crime is growing up. 
 But the consensus about the desired goals of legal policy toward young of-
fenders has contrasted with wild disagreements about the most appropriate doc-
trinal and institutional strategies to secure a safe path to adulthood. Should we 
encourage the continued development of separate courts for juvenile offenders 
or create instead young offender branches of criminal courts? Should the ad-
justments that legal institutions make when determining the punishment for 
young offenders be fixed discounts based on immaturity or an entirely separate 
schedule of sanctions in a separate legal institution? Should the courts stay out 
of interfering in family conflicts and running away by adolescents or attempt to 
reduce the dangers of conflict without resorting to secure confinement? Should 
legislatures specify which criminal charges require criminal courts and extraor-
dinary levels of imprisonment or are individual hearings prior to transfer to 
criminal courts always the proper function of juvenile courts? 
 No observer can doubt the consistent passion that Barry Feld has displayed 
toward the protection of young offenders from the destructive excesses of the 
penal systems in the United States. And no reader of his essay in this volume 
can doubt Barry’s candor in documenting his twists and turns in choosing pro-
cedural and institutional strategies to secure safe passage to adulthood for 
young offenders. He has come to support a separate and discretion-laden juve-
nile court for adolescent offenders only after documenting the costs of juvenile 
court hegemony and showing the dangers of lawlessness that have been the 
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legacy of open-ended juvenile court powers. What sets Barry Feld apart from 
other students of American juvenile justice is his rigor in analyzing policies ad-
vocated for juvenile courts—including those for which he advocated—and his 
willingness to openly reconsider his own preferences when the facts warrant 
reconsideration. When Feld’s commitment to youth welfare has clashed with 
his interests in preserving the consistency of his procedural preferences, he is 
always ready to revise his opinion. This is by no means a universal characteris-
tic for prominent academic experts. It is, to paraphrase Dr. King, a laudatory 
aspect of the content of Barry Feld’s character. 
*   *   *   *   * 
Why then must we persist in creating a separate court for adolescent of-
fenders? It is not to provide downward adjustments in criminal penalties be-
cause of the diminished responsibility that is characteristic of immaturity. 
Criminal courts should be able to moderate the retributive demands of penal 
justice for young persons as well as for offenders who suffer from mental and 
emotional handicaps. Downward adjustments in the scale of just retributive 
punishments do not require a separate court for the young. 
But downward adjustments in deserved custodial punishments will not al-
low many offenders to grow up in community settings and outgrow their ado-
lescent criminal propensities. The juvenile courts in progressive nations do not 
dispense penal justice in their dispositions but rather impose less severe disrup-
tions in the lives of young offenders than retributive justice would often de-
mand. We give our youth less disruptive sanctions to subsidize their normal 
maturation in community settings. This is often a lot less than penal desert 
might require and that is why a separate court is necessary to support the con-
tinual legal discrimination in favor of normal adolescent maturity. In the long 
run, community safety can be well served by this pro-youth orientation, but the 
justification for juvenile justice is not merely utilitarian. Juvenile courts can al-
so reinforce the moral value of supporting young persons of all colors and clas-
ses. There are measures of justice more important than penal desert in most 
cases, and that is why the juvenile justice system attracts the attention of so 
many of the law’s most admirable advocates. Mary Berkheiser and Barry Feld 
are prominent members of that pantheon. 
